Belief Translation On Other Language:
Belief in Persian
du lat. credere «confier» et fig. «avoir confiance».
comes from Proto-Indo-European *k'erd- "heart," found today in English "heart," German "Herz," Greek "kardia," and French "cœur" from Latin cor, cordis "heart." The special fronted [k'] in this root became an [s] in the Eastern PIE languages, so the same stem turns up in Armenian "sirt" and Russian serdce "heart." The root "cred-ere" ostensibly underwent metathesis, the switching of places by two letters, so that original cerd- > cred-.(az del )grav-idan (plv. viravistan)
fra. faire croire aux gens : be bâvar e mardom nešândan, (be) bâvar-ândan
... scientifique attitude : It is not what
the man of science believes that distiguishes him, but how
he believes it.
His beliefs are tentative, not dogmatic; they are based on evidence, not on authority or intuition.
(B. RUSSELL, History of Western Philosophy, p. 514)
What is wanted is not the will to believe, but the wish to find out, which is the exact opposite.
(B. RUSSELL, Sceptical essays, p. 131)
Volonté de ne pas savoir et volonté de croire vont de pair.
Il y a eu des valeurs, mais il n'y en a plus (...) Le monde a marché tant qu'on a cru en Dieu, dans la raison, le progrès.
Mais nous ne croyons plus qu'à une chose qui ne comporte aucune politique. Nous ne croyons plus qu'à la mort.
(P. NIZAN, le Cheval de Troie, V.)
To believe is to know you believe, and to know you believe is not to believe.
(Jean-Paul Sartre) => croirebâvar (-dâšt/mandi) (plv. vâvar)
pazir-oft(-a-šoda ye bi-porseš)
=> croyance religieuse
Belief is not a precise concept, because of the continuity between the lowest animals and man.
(B. RUSSELL, My philosophical development, p. 114)
What an asserted sentence expresses is a belief
; what makes it true or false is a fact
, which is in general distinct from the belief.
"Belief", as I wish to use the word, denotes a state of mind or body or both, in which an animal acts with reference to something not sensibly present.
A belief, we may say, is a collection of states of an organism bound together by all having, in whole or part, the same external reference.
We may take this as the essence of what may be called "static" belief, as opposed to belief shown by action : static belief consists in an idea or image combined with a yes-feeling.
I suggest that what really constitutes belief in a general proposition is a mental habit : when you think of a particular man, you think "yes, mortal", provided the question of mortality arises.
(B. RUSSELL, Human knowledge: its scope and limits (1948), p. 128-9, 162, 164, 449)
It seems to me that there are at least three kinds of belief, namely memory, expectation and bare assent.
Thus James says: "Everyone knows the difference between imagining a thing and believing in its existence, between supposing a proposition and acquiescing in its truth...IN ITS INNER NATURE, BELIEF, OR THE SENSE OF REALITY, IS A SORT OF FEELING MORE ALLIED TO THE EMOTIONS THAN TO ANYTHING ELSE" ("Psychology," vol. ii, p. 283. James's italics).
(B. RUSSELL, Lecture XII. Belief )
A belief is rendered true or false by relation to a fact, which may lie outside the experience of the person entertaining the belief.
We wish to believe that our beliefs, sometimes at least, yield KNOWLEDGE, and a belief does not yield knowledge unless it is true.
Belief in the existence of things outside my own biography exists antecedently to evidence, and can only be destroyed, if at all, by a long course of philosophic doubt. For purposes of science, it is justified practically by the simplification which it introduces into the laws of physics. But from the standpoint of theoretical logic it must be regarded as a prejudice, not as a well-grounded theory. With this proviso, I propose to continue yielding to the prejudice.
(B. RUSSELL, The Analysis of Mind )
We may end our preliminary catalogue with BELIEF, by which I mean that way of being conscious which may be either true or false. We say that a man is "conscious of looking a fool," by which we mean that he believes he looks a fool, and is not mistaken in this belief. This is a different form of consciousness from any of the earlier ones [perception, memory, thought]. It is the form which gives "knowledge" in the strict sense, and also error. It is, at least apparently, more complex than our previous forms of consciousness; though we shall find that they are not so separable from it as they might appear to be.
(B. RUSSELL, The Analysis of Mind )
The study of past times and uncivilized races makes it clear beyond question that the customary beliefs of tribes or nations are almost invariably false. It is difficult to divest ourselves completely of the customary beliefs of our own age and nation, but it is not very difficult to achieve a certain degree of doubt in regard to them.
(B. RUSSELL, Political Ideals )
Thus although beliefs are not directly responsible for more than a small part of our actions, the actions for which they are responsible are among the most important, and largely determine the general structure of our lives.
We have thus a hierarchy of comforting beliefs: those private to the individual, those which he shares with his family, those common to his class or his nation, and finally those that are equally delightful to all mankind. [...] There are two ways in which our natural beliefs are corrected: one the contact with fact, as when we mistake a poisonous fungus for a mushroom and suffer pain in consequence; the other, when our beliefs conflict, not directly with objective fact, but with the opposite beliefs of other men. [...] Step by step, relations with other human beings dispel the myths of all but the most successful. Personal conceit is dispelled by brothers, family conceit by schoolfellows, class conceit by politics, national conceit by defeat in war or commerce. But human conceit remains, and in this region, so far as the effect of social intercourse is concerned, the myth-making faculty has free play. Against this form of delusion, a partial corrective is found in Science; but the corrective can never be more than partial, for without some credulity, Science itself would crumble and collapse.
The great scandals in the philosophy of science ever since the time of Hume have been causality and induction. We all believe in both, but Hume made it appear that our belief is a blind faith for which no rational ground can be assigned.
The test of belief is not conformity with 'fact', since we can never reach the facts concerned; the test is its success in promoting life and the achievements of our desires.
Truth is a property of beliefs, and beliefs are psychical events. Moreover their relation to facts does not have the schematic simplicity which logic assumes; to have pointed this out is a second merit in pragmatism. Beliefs are vague and complex, pointing to not one precise fact, but to several vague regions of fact. Beliefs, therefore, unlike the schematic propositions of logic, are not sharply opposed as true or false, but are a blur of truth and falsehood; they are of varying shades of grey, never white or black. People who speak with reverence of the 'truth' would do better to speak about Fact, and to realise that the reverend qualities to which they pay homage are not to be found in human beliefs.
William James used to preach the 'will to believe'. For my part, I should wish to preach the 'will to doubt'. None of our beliefs are quite true; all have at least a penumbra of vagueness and error. The methods of increasing the degree of truth in our beliefs are well known; they consist in hearing all sides, trying to ascertain all the relevant facts, controlling our own bias by discussion with people who have the opposite bias, and cultivating a readiness to discard any hypothesis which has proved inadequate. These methods are practised in science, and have built up the body of scientific knowledge. Every man of science whose outlook is truly scientific is ready to admit that what passes for scientific knowledge at the moment is sure to require correction with the progress of discovery; nevertheless, it is near enough to the truth to serve for most practical purposes, though not for all. In science, where alone something approximating to genuine knowledge is to be found, men's attitude is tentative and full of doubt. In religion and politics, on the contrary, though there is as yet nothing approaching scientific knowledge, everybody considers it de rigueur
to have a dogmatic opinion, to be backed up by inflicting starvation, prison, and war, and to be carefully guarded from argumentative competition with any different opinion. If only men could be brought into a tentatively agnostic frame of mind about these matters, nine-tenths of the evils of the modern world would be cured. War would become impossible, because each side would realise that both sides must be in the wrong. ...
When I speak of belief I mean dogmatic opinions on matters as to which the truth is not known.
(B. RUSSELL, Sceptical essays, p. 8, 17-18, 30, 46, 47-8, 129, 198)
I think that Greek literature and art are probably very misleading as regards popular beliefs.
(B. RUSSELL, History of Western Philosophy, p. 257)
... l'illusio, la croyance et les conditions de la production et du fonctionnement de cette dénégation collective.
l'illusion, c'est-à-dire la croyance, ...
... la croyance, ou toute autre espèce d'acquis culturel, peut se vivre comme à la fois logiquement nécessaire et sociologiquement inconditionnée.
La limite fait surgir la différence et les choses différentes "par une institution" arbitraire", comme disait Leibnitz traduisant le ex instituto
de la scholastique, acte proprement magique qui suppose et produit la croyance collective, c'est-à-dire l'ignorance de son propre arbitraire ;
La croyance, qui est toujours collective, s'accomplit et se légitime en devenant pulique et officielle, en s'affirmant et s'affichant, au lieu de se cacher, comme fait le rituel illégitime (c'est-à-dire dominé, comme la magie féminine) qui, comme le voleur selon Weber, reconnaît par là mêmela légitimité, et sa propre illégitimité.
(P. BOURDIEU, Le sens pratique, p. 84, 348, 392)
... le pouvoir symbolique ne réside pas dans les "systèmes symboliques" sous la forme d'une "illocutionary force" mais qu'il se définit dans et par une relation déterminée entre ceux qui exercent le pouvoir et ceux qui le subissent, c'est-à-dire dans la structure même du champ où se produit et se reproduit la croyance
. Ce qui fait le pouvoir des mots et des mots d'ordre, pouvoir de maintenir l'ordre ou de le subvertir, c'est la croyance dans la légitimité des mots et de celui qui les prononce, croyance qu'il n'appartient pas aux mots de produire.
(P. BOURDIEU, Langage et pouvoir symbolique, poche p. 210)
141- Si nous commençons à croire
à qqch, ce n'est pas une propositions isolé, mais un système entier de proposition. (La lumière se répand graduellement sur tout.)
160-L'enfant apprend en croyant l'adulte. Le doute vient après
253- A la base de croyance fondée, il y a la croyance qui n'est pas fondée.
(WITTGENSTEIN, de la certitude)
Dictionary source: French Persian Dictionary
French to Persian translation of belief